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Abstract 
 
In 1988 the vertical separation of the Swedish State Railways into one train operator (SJ) and one 
infrastructure holder (Banverket) was implemented. Together with the transfer of responsibility for 
the regional non-profitable passenger railway services to regional transport authorities, this reform 
paved the way for the introduction of competitive tendering for these services. Initially, only one new 
firm entered, but through subsequent tenders this figure has increased to four. Since 1992 it has also 
been possible for the state’s negotiator to procure the non-profitable interregional services by means 
of tendering. For several years no actual entry occurred on this part of the market, partly due to more 
demanding conditions compared to other tenders. However, following the outcome of the latest 
tenders, new entry is set to take place in January 2000. Consequently, what started as a very slow 
walk towards more competition in the railway sector has taken us to a point where SJ is facing actual 
competition on almost all parts of the market. In addition to discussing the new entrants, the different 
types of tenders are compared in some detail in the paper. Some empirical data on the number of 
bidders, cost reductions, innovations and travelling changes related to tenders is presented and 
interpreted. The development of the behaviour of SJ and its competitors is also discussed, as well as 
the further impact upon transport policy. 
 
Introduction 
 
In several countries today, not the least in Europe, a process of reforms in the railway sector has been 
initiated, aiming at breaking up the national railway companies’ exclusive right of access to the tracks. 
In Great Britain, a radical policy has lead to a privatisation of the whole railway sector and a division 
of its functions and business areas into a large number of separate firms. In most other countries, a 
more cautious route towards change has been applied, with a step-wise introduction of competition for 
the tracks, while the national railway company has been kept more or less intact. 
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In this respect, Sweden has come a rather long way, opening up almost all parts of the railway market 
to some form of competition. The purpose of this paper is to show how this development came about, 
and point at its most important effects, for example in terms of new entrants, and the still on-going 
process of regulatory change. 
 
Going from monopoly to competition1 
 
The Transport Policy Act of 1988 implied a division of the state’s railway assets between one 
infrastructure holder, the National Rail Administration (Banverket) and one train operator, Swedish 
State Railways (SJ). This groundbreaking reform is generally considered as the starting point for what 
is referred to as the deregulation of the Swedish railway sector, since it implied that an important 
prerequisite for competition became established. However, this was hardly the primary goal with the 
reform. Rather, in similarity to preceding and later regulatory changes, the most important goal was to 
find a way to handle SJ’s financial problems and to create favourable conditions for SJ to become a 
profitable train operator.2 
 
Several other regulatory changes had preceded the split. For instance, SJ was already in 1985 
instructed to separate infrastructure from operations in its accounting. Also, the establishment of the 
county public transport authorities (CPTAs)3 in the early 1980’s turned out to be of great importance 
for the introduction of competition in the railway sector in the 1990’s. One part of the Transport 
Policy Act was the decision to transfer the responsibility for the passenger train services of the 
regional (county) lines4 to these county public transport authorities - along with the rolling stock and 
the money needed to uphold these services. Combined with the separation of infrastructure from 
operations, the effect was that competitive tendering of railway services became a reality in Sweden. 
Some CPTAs arranged their first competitive tenders for passenger train services in 1989, as part of 
the preparations for the transfer of responsibility for the regional lines in mid 1990. Others chose only 
to negotiate with SJ, making SJ the contracted operator without a preceding tender. 
                                                                                                                                                        
*
 Presenting author. 
1A thorough description of the regulatory changes in the Swedish railway sector can be found in Alexandersson 
& Hultén (1999). 
2The political process leading to the Transport Policy Act of 1988 is described by Nilsson (1995). 
3
 In each of Sweden’s 23 counties, the responsibility for local and regional public transportation (by bus and 
now also by train) lies jointly at the county council and the municipalities of the county. In order to to handle 
this responsibility, it has been common to create a separate authority taking the form of a limited company, its 
shares being owned by the county council and the municipalities. These authorities procure the traffic from bus 
operators and train operators and are referred to as the county public transport authorities. 
4All railway lines were categorised as being either county lines or main lines. For reasons of simplicity, the 
terms ”regional” and ”inter-regional” lines/services are used in this paper. ”Regional” services then refer to 
passenger services run primarily within a county, while ”inter-regional” services refer to traffic crossing at least 
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When SJ got rid of the responsibility for the track infrastructure, it was directed only to perform train 
services under its own account when this could be done with a profit. While large parts of the non-
profitable services were run on the regional lines and therefore came under the responsibility of the 
CPTAs, there were also some services on the inter-regional network that were non-profitable, but 
nevertheless were considered to be valuable to keep for socio-economic and political reasons. 
Beginning in 1988, the state was to be responsible for these services by means of procuring them, 
instead of just transferring subsidies to SJ every year to cover the deficits. Up to and including the 
year 1991, these procurements took place without the use of comptitive tendering, i.e. the state’s 
negotiator5had the task of trying to get SJ to perform as much traffic as possible for a sum that was 
decided upon each year. Following the experiences of competitive tendering for regional services, a 
regulatory change made it possible also for the state’s negotiator to use competitive tendering, coming 
into effect in 1992. A special case of state procurement concerned the building of the infrastructure 
for the new Arlanda Airport Link and the running of passenger train services on this line. It was 
tendered as a BOT project (Build-Operate-Transfer) in 1993-94.6 
 
In spring 1994, a bill on a far-reaching deregulation was passed in Parliament, which would have 
implied open access on all lines for all train operators on January 1, 1995. However, this decision was 
cancelled in late 1994 after a shift of power in Parliament following the General Election that year. 
Instead, the new Government implemented a deregulation on the rail freight market in 1996, and 
simultaneously enlarged the possibilities for the CPTAs to run inter-regional passenger services. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
one county border. 
5
 The state’s negotiator is a special authority for the procurement of inter-regional passenger services. Since 
1996 it has been organised as a division within Banverket. 
6
 This is a brand new line connecting the Central Station of Stockholm with Arlanda Airport. The decision to let 
the procurement concern both the building of the infrastructure for the line and the operations of passenger 
services, was due to a widely held belief that this line, if any, would be possible to run with a profit. Therefore, 
the conditions for attracting private investors were considered favourable. For a full description of the 
procurement process, see Alexandersson & Hultén (1998). 
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Following from all these events and regulatory changes, the only part of the railway market where SJ 
still holds a legal monopoly concerns the inter-regional passenger services that SJ is able to run with a 
profit by its own account, that is without the use of any subsidies. The forms of competition now in 
use on different parts of the railway market are summarised in Table 1, also indicating the changed 
situation compared to 1988. 
 
Table 1. Forms of competition on different parts of the Swedish railway market 
Part of railway market 1988 1999 Year of 
change 
Passenger services    
Regional (non-profitable) SJ holds monopoly and 
receives subsidies 
Procurement by 
competitive tendering 
(competition for the 
tracks) 
Gross cost contracts 
1989 
Inter-regional (non-profitable) SJ holds monopoly and 
receives subsidies 
Procurement by 
competitive tendering 
(competition for the 
tracks) 
Net cost contracts 
1992 
Inter-regional (profitable) SJ holds monopoly SJ holds monopoly -- 
Freight services SJ holds monopoly Open access on all 
lines (competition on 
the tracks), limited by 
grandfathering* 
1996 
 
* Already established traffic flows of freight trains have higher priority when the available timetable 
positions are distributed among train operators. 
 
 
Different types of tenders and contracts 
 
The competitive tenders performed by the county public transport authorities differ from the ones 
performed by the state’s negotiator in several respects. Three may be regarded as particularly 
important: 1) who has the power to influence what traffic to be tendered and when, 2) the distribution 
of areas of responsibility, costs and revenues between the train operator and the procuring authority, 
influencing the type of contracts in use, and, 3) the availability of rolling stock. These differences are 
well worth a closer look. 
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What traffic to be tendered and when 
 
All passenger services under the responsibility of the CPTAs may be subjected to competitive 
tendering, although some authorities have chosen only to negotiate with SJ. Generally, the tendered 
contracts run for 3-5 years, but there are still some old agreements with SJ that reach well into the 
next decade. They have yet to be tendered for the first time. 
 
The state’s negotiator arranges tenders almost every year but for various amounts of traffic. Some of 
the contracts only run for 1-2 years, but nowadays a couple of 5-year-contracts are also in use. In 
order for a line to become subjected to the state’s tendering process, SJ first has to announce that it 
has become unprofitable. Not until then, the Government and the Parliament will consider whether the 
passenger services on this line are believed to be of such socio-economic importance that they should 
be upheld by means of taxpayers’ money and consequently should be subjected to tendering. Since 
the financial situation for each of SJ’s lines is never made public, it is possible for SJ to keep an 
unprofitable line from being tendered, for example if SJ has reason to believe that the line could 
become profitable in the near future. However, as of today, only a few inter-regional lines have never 
been subjected to tendering: Stockholm-Göteborg, Stockholm-Malmö, Stockholm-Karlstad, 
Stockholm-Sundsvall, Stockholm-Östersund and Stockholm-Falun/Borlänge/Mora. The latter two 
were reported by SJ to have become unprofitable in October 1998, but SJ later withdraw this report. 
 
Distribution of areas of responsibility 
 
For the passenger services that are tendered by the CPTAs, it is generally the case that these 
authorities are also responsible for planning the services (supply, routes and timetables) and market 
them. They also decide upon ticket fares, and, most importantly, all the revenues from ticket fares 
accrue to the CPTA. The train operator is compensated for its costs for performing the actual railway 
services, implying a gross cost contract. In the tenders, the train operators compete by placing bids 
where the most important factor is the gross amount of money demanded to perform the services. This 
is in sharp contrast to the situation for the services tendered by the state. For these services, the 
contracted train operator bears a much larger part of the costs and the responsibility for planning the 
services, and in return gets all the revenues from ticket fares. In addition to this, the operator receives 
an amount from the state that is supposed to cover the expected deficit, implying a net cost contract. 
In these tenders, the competing train operators place bids where the demanded amount of subsidy to 
cover the deficit is the most important factor. 
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Availability of rolling stock 
 
The CPTAs have in their possession, often by direct ownership, the vehicles needed to carry out the 
traffic, which are made available for the operator to use during the contract period. The state as a 
procuring authority, on the other hand, does not control the rolling stock, despite the fact that SJ is 
fully state-owned. Therefore, a new entrant either has to be prepared to put in own resources of 
vehicles or close a deal with SJ on renting vehicles. 
 
Actual competition and new entry 
 
The different conditions for different types of tenders have clearly been important for the degree of 
actual competition, in terms of the number of bidders aside from SJ for each contract, and in particular 
for the outcome in terms of new entries. It is unquestionable that the entry barriers are considerably 
lower for the services procured by the CPTAs, compared to the ones procured by the state. Table 2 is 
a compilation of the number of bidders and the resulting winner for a selection of tenders carried out 
by the CPTAs since 1989. Table 3 is a similar compilation of the yearly rounds of tendering carried 
out by the state’s negotiator since 1992. It can be noted that 2-4 bidders have been common in the 
tenders carried out by the CPTAs, although there are exceptions. The tenders for the three metro lines 
of Stockholm attracted less bidders for every new line that was subjected to tendering, while as many 
as five bids were filed when the services of the new high speed tram line were tendered. 
 
The first year of tendering for the traffic procured by the state, 1992, attracted as many as 6 bidders, 
although three of these never made it to the final negotiations. One bidder (apart from SJ) placed bids 
on all the tendered lines. For a couple of the following years, these tenders attracted less bidders, but 
the number has increased again in recent years (Table 3). 
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Table 2. A selection of tenders arranged by county public transport authorities 
County Traffic / line Tendered 
 year  
Number 
of  
bidders 
Winner Start of 
contract 
Jönköping/ County lines of  1989 4 BK Tåg May 1990 
Halland Jönköping and 1993 2 SJ June 1994 
 Halland 1997 3 BSM Järnväg Aug 1998 
Dalarna Borlänge-Malung 1992 ≥2 BK Tåg June 1992 
  1994 2 SJ June 1994 
  1996 4 BK Tåg June 1997 
Kristiansta
d 
Ystad-Simrishamn 1995 2 Sydtåg June 1995 
  1998 2 BK Tåg June 1999 
Stockholm Lidingö tram line 1992 ≥21 SL Lidingö Trafik Aug 1993 
  1996 1 SL Lidingö 
Trafik3 
Aug 1997 
 Nockeby tram line 1992 ≥2 1 SL Tunnelbanan Aug 1993 
 Nockeby tram line/ 
High-speed tram line 
south 
1998 5 SL Tunnelbanan Aug 1999 
 Saltsjö line 1992 ≥2 1 SL Tåg3 Aug 1993 
 Metro 3 1993 3 SL Tunnelbanan Aug 1994 
 Metro 2 1994 2 SL Tunnelbanan Aug 1995 
 Metro 1 1995 1 SL Tunnelbanan Aug 1996 
 Roslagen line 1997 4 Linjebuss Jan 1998 
 Commuter trains of 
Stockholm 
1998 4 (+1)2 BK Tåg 
+ Via GTI 
+ Go Ahead 
Jan 2000 
 
1
 These lines attracted a total of four bidders. 
2
 One bidder withdraw from the tender before completion. 
3
 The traffic is now carried out by the sister company SL Tunnelbanan, a subsidiary to the regional 
transport authority of Stockholm. 
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Table 3. The state’s tenders 
Year of Number of bidders  Winner(s) Start of 
tender All lines Certain lines Total  contract 
1992 2 3 3 (+3) 3 SJ Jun 1993 
1993 1 2 3 SJ Jun 1994 
1994a 1 2 2 SJ Jun 1995 
1994b1   2 (+2) 3 ALC (A-Train) Aug 1999 
1995 1 1 (+2) 3 1 (+2) 3 SJ Jun 1996 
1997 1 3 3 (+1) 3 SJ Jan 1998 
1998a 1 2 2 SJ Jan 1999 
1998b2   ≥3 BK Tåg 
+ Via GTI 
+ Go Ahead 
Jan 2000 
1999 1 2 ≥3 SJ 
Svenska 
Tågkompaniet4 
BSM Järnväg4 
Jan 2000 
 
1
 Refers to the BOT tender of the Arlanda Airport Link. 
2
 Refers to the traffic between Göteborg and Malmö on the West Coast Line. 
3
 Figures within brackets refer to bidders that withdraw from the tender before it was completed. 
4
 Entry dependent on final decision to be taken by Government. 
 
 
These changes over time and between different tenders may have several reasons, apart from what has 
been mentioned above about the different conditions in different types of tenders: 1) some companies 
chose not to continue to place bids in tenders when it didn’t pay off at once, 2) a couple of new 
players have entered the scene in recent years, for example the bus operator Swebus after having been 
sold by SJ to Stagecoach in 1996, 3) some companies have learnt from early experiences, coming 
back with newly gained strengths in the form of alliances with other firms, 4) some long-term-
agreements made in the state’s tender in 1993 implied that some of the most interesting lines were not 
tendered for a couple of years, and, 5) some firms have chosen only to place bids in tenders 
concerning very large amounts of traffic. 
 
A complete list of the new entrants to the Swedish railway market is presented in Table 4, including 
also the entrants to the rail freight market. After the groundbreaking new entry of the private train 
operator BK Tåg in 1990, it took five years before any additional new entry took place. As more and 
more lines have become subjected to tendering, the rate of new entry has accelerated in recent years. 
Until very recently, entry had only taken place by means of the tenders arranged by the CPTAs (with 
the exception of the special case of the Arlanda Airport Link). However, the tender carried out by the 
state’s negotiator in late 1998 will imply that we for the very first time will have a new entrant on an 
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inter-regional line – the West Coast Line – in January 2000.7 The implications of this will be 
discussed later in the paper. 
 
Table 4. New entrants to the Swedish railway market 1990-2000 
Year Passenger 
services tendered 
by CPTAs 
Passenger services 
tendered by the state 
Freight services 
1990 BK Tåg   
1991   Österlentåg1 
   Sydtåg2 
   Dalatåg3 
1992    
1993   LKAB/Malmtrafik 
   Wasatrafik4 
1994   Shortline Väst 
   Tågåkeriet 
   Woxna Express 
   BK Tåg 
   BSX/Urnet5 
1995 Sydtåg2  Skövde-Karlsborgs Järnväg 
1996    
1997   BSM Järnväg 
   Inlandsgods 
1998 Linjebuss/CGEA  Orsatåg 
 BSM Järnväg   
1999  A-Train6  
2000 VIA GTI/Go Ahead7 VIA GTI/Go Ahead7  
  BSM Järnväg8  
  Svenska Tågkompaniet8  
 
1
 Bankrupt in 1994. Business taken over by Sydtåg. 
2
 Bankrupt in 1997. Passenger services taken over by BK Tåg. 
3
 Bankrupt in 1996. 
4
 Services taken over by Woxna Express in 1994. 
5
 Business liquidated in 1997. Assets taken over by BSM Järnväg. 
6
 Entry through the BOT tender (carried out in 1993-94) of the Arlanda Airport Link. 
7
 In alliance with BK Tåg. 
8
 Entry dependent on final decision to be taken by Government. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The tender for the inter-regional passenger services of the West Coast Line (Göteborg-Malmö) was a unique 
event, since SJ had not officially demanded that it should be tendered, despite having lost money on this line for 
several years. By means of rationalisations, SJ had managed to reduce the losses from 80 million to 30 million 
SEK per annum, hoping that it would be possible to make the line profitable in the near future. A special 
Parliamentary decision to subject the line to tendering was taken in 1998, caused by fears that without subsidies, 
SJ would reduce the frequency of trains as competition from long-distance buses grew stronger. 
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The market share situation in late 1998 for different parts and sublevels of the railway market is 
presented in Table 5, which is based upon the turnover of the active firms. The compilation shows that 
SJ’s position is still very strong on most parts of the market. At a higher level of aggregation, SJ is 
totally dominant. For the market referring to the traffic tendered by county public transport authorities 
(excluding the metro of Stockholm and some tram lines), SJ achieves only a 55% market share. The 
second largest firm is Linjebuss, with a turnover of 94 million SEK on the Roslagen line, followed by 
SL Tunnelbanan with a turnover of about 36 million SEK on Saltsjö line. Both these lines are located 
in the county of Stockholm. 
 
However, already in August 1999, the market share situation will be changed, since A-Train will then 
enter as the train operator on the Arlanda Airport Link. Even bigger changes will come about in 
January 2000. This is when BK Tåg, Via GTI and Go Ahead will take over SJ’s single most important 
contract - the commuter services of Stockholm - and also the inter-regional passenger services on the 
West Coast Line. Although depending on the outcome of the Government’s decision concerning the 
latest round of tendering by the state’s negotiator, it also seems likely that BSM Järnväg will increase 
its share and that another new entrant, Svenska Tågkompaniet, will see the day in January 2000. 
 
Table 5. Market shares on separate parts of the Swedish railway market 19988 
Part of railway market SJ Second 
largest 
firm 
Third 
largest 
firm 
All private 
firms 
Passenger traffic tendered by CPTAs 55,3% 24,5% 9,6% 35,2% 
All tendered passenger traffic 86,7% 7,3% 2,9% 10,5% 
All passenger traffic 96,9% 1,7% 0,7% 2,5% 
All freight traffic 91,1% 8,0% 0,2% 0,9% 
All railway traffic 93,8% 4,3% 0,8% 1,6% 
 
 
                                                 
8Adapted from Alexandersson, Hultén & Ehrling (1998). 
 11 
 
 
The conduct of the firms 
 
SJ’s view upon its competitors has shifted over time. For many years, SJ claimed that competition 
from other modes of transportation was quite enough, but lately increased competition from other 
train operators has even been encouraged by SJ’s top management. One reason for this is that more 
entrants would give SJ a higher credibility when claiming that it is a company facing tough 
competition. Nine years ago, the entry of BK Tåg in 1990 was initially met with a very hostile, almost 
predatory behaviour from SJ. This led to a process of legal actions and finally a trial in 1998, in which 
SJ was accused by the Swedish Competition Authority for having tried to force BK Tåg out of the 
market. In December 1998 SJ was sentenced to a fine of 8 million SEK for placing a bid in a tender 
that was too low to cover SJ’s own costs. This sentence will make it possible for BK Tåg to sue SJ for 
damages. In recent years, the relationship between SJ and its competitors has become more relaxed, 
for example leading to some co-operation in the use of spare vehicles. Most noteworthy, BSM 
Järnväg works as a subcontractor to SJ on two lines since August 1998. 
 
The competing firms have also changed their behaviour and their strategies. BK Tåg faced its 
difficulties in winning tenders for passenger services by competing on the relatively more easily 
accessed rail freight market. Entry to this part of the market has also functioned as a way to make a 
first move into the railway industry for companies like Sydtåg and BSM Järnväg, there building a 
position from which it has been possible to take the step into the passenger rail market. The Swedish 
firms have also gone into alliances with foreign companies. After having lost the second tender for the 
traffic in the counties of  Jönköping and Halland in 1993, BK Tåg initiated a co-operation with French 
company Via GTI, added with British Go Ahead Group in 1998. Similarly, Linjebuss started to co-
operate with French CGEA in 1993, a company that went on to buy Linjebuss in 1998. 
 
Effects on costs and innovations etc. 
 
Data on cost reductions caused by the tenders carried out by the CPTAs is somewhat scarce, partly 
due to difficulties when comparing cost levels under different conditions. The first tender of the 
regional services in the counties of Jönköping and Halland reduced the transport authorities’ costs  by 
21%. The second tender implied a further reduction of about 25%, while the third tender caused only 
a slight decrease in costs. There is reason to believe that the second tender pushed down the price for 
performing the services too low to cover all costs, at least for some operators. (This tender was the 
basis for the legal actions against SJ.) The tender for the line Simrishamn-Ystad implied a cost 
reduction of 18-21%. Finally, the recently completed tender for the commuter services of Stockholm 
will reduce costs with 25%, despite the fact that the lowest bid was not chosen. 
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For the services procured by the state, the big cost reductions were accomplished during the first two 
years of tendering, -21% in fixed prices and similar volumes of traffic. Since then, the state’s costs 
have been kept stable. The mere threat of competition in these tenders seems to have been enough to 
push down the price demanded by SJ. The result of the tender of the West Coast Line may imply that 
SJ’s annual losses of 30 million SEK ”disapper”, since the winning consortium does not ask for any 
subsidies, claiming that ticket revenues will cover the costs. Simultaneously, the very same ticket 
revenues are lost by SJ (totalling about 200 million SEK per annum), although some new revenues are 
to be accrued to SJ from hiring out the rolling stock. 
 
All available examples of innovation caused by new entry originate from the experiences of one 
company, BK Tåg, following its entry in 1990. The company was very active in changing the railway 
specific equipment of the rail cars to more standardised bus parts. Perhaps the most important thing 
was a switch to bus engines, which turned out to be better suited for the Swedish climate, more 
environmentally friendly and cheaper to use and maintain. New routines and working conditions were 
also introduced by BK Tåg, making the drivers responsible for fuel refilling and cleaning rather than 
just driving the trains. These changes may be regarded as minor, but they had nevertheless been 
considered impossible to implement under SJ’s regime. The new working conditions were easier for 
BK Tåg to implement, partly because the company had a large degree of freedom when choosing its 
employees when it started up its business. SJ has later been able to replicate several of the good 
examples. 
 
Other changes, for example effects upon travelling rates, are harder to link to new entrants. Rather, the 
co-ordination of regional train services with bus services, and the high level of ambition among many 
county public transport authorities to develop the regional train services, has probably been more 
important in this respect. 
 
Concluding analysis and discussion 
 
The step-wise approach to deregulation and reforms in the Swedish railway sector, initiated in 1988 
with the split of the state’s railway assets and the decentralisation of responsibility to regional 
transport authorities, is now beginning to reveal its long-term effects. Today, it is easier to list the 
lines that have not been subjected to competitive tendering than the opposite. While events of new 
entry used to be rare and far between, we are now on the brink of a break-through for the private train 
operators. When BK Tåg, together with its partners VIA GTI and Go Ahead Group, starts to run the 
commuter services of Stockholm in January next year, and also the services on the West Coast Line, 
SJ will suddenly have a real and strong competitor in the passenger train market. The still preliminary 
results of the state’s latest tender indicate that there is more to come. 
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The result of the recently completed tender of the West Coast Line gives rise to a couple of 
fundamental questions, in particular caused by the fact that the winning private consortium does not 
demand any subsidies from the state to carry out the traffic, but claims that ticket revenues will be 
enough. What if a line that has been tendered because it is unprofitable suddenly turns out to break-
even or even becomes profitable? Does SJ then, based upon its legal monopoly on profitable inter-
regional lines, have the right to get the line back without having to win a new tender? Or should the 
line be tendered, applying a system where the winner is the firm willing to pay the largest amount of 
money for the right to perform the services? And if such a system is applied on one line - why not 
apply it to all supposedly profitable lines? In Great Britain, to give a simplified picture of the events, 
all lines have been subjected to tendering - also the profitable ones. Perhaps the regulatory framework 
in Sweden is about to develop in the same direction. 
 
A series of regulatory reforms in both the bus industry and in the railway sector have caused 
previously separate industries to come closer to each other. The new entrants to the Swedish market 
for passenger railway services have a history as bus operators or companies working in a broadly 
defined transportation sector. Related to this, the Swedish railway sector has become increasingly 
dependent on events taking place in other countries - and vice versa. Train operators like Stagecoach 
and Go Ahead are the results of privatisations and deregulations in Great Britain - to some extent 
reforms that once were inspired by the groundbreaking split of SJ. The appearance of new operators 
acting on an international scene, sometimes through the formation of international alliances, seems to 
be what will eventually tear down the barrier of the national border, by tradition of such importance in 
the European railway sector. 
 
 14 
 
 
References 
 
Alexandersson, G. & Hultén, S. (1998), Arlandabanan - järnvägsbygge med privata intressenter, in 
Nordisk Transportforskning, Järnvägens organisation och finansiering, Konferensrapport 1998:1 [in 
Swedish] 
 
Alexandersson, G. & Hultén, S. (1999): Sweden, chapter 3 in Van de Velde, D. M. (ed.): Changing 
Trains. Railway Reform and the Role of Competition. The Experience of Six Countries, Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, England 
 
Alexandersson, G., Hultén, S. & Ehrling, G. (1998), Avreglering på svenska - exemplet järnvägen, 
KFB-meddelande 1998:18, Kommunikationsforskningsberedningen [in Swedish] 
 
Nilsson, J-E. (1995): Swedish Railways Case Study, CTS Working Paper 1995:2 (reprint of chapter 8 
in Kopicki, R. & Thompson, L. S. (ed.): Best Methods of Railway Reconstructuring, CFS Discussion 
Paper Series, No. 111, The World Bank) 
 15 
 
 
Gunnar Alexandersson, M.Sc. 
 
Gunnar Alexandersson is a doctoral student at the Department for Marketing, Distribution and 
Industrial Dynamics at the Stockholm School of Economics. He received his Master of Science 
degree at this school in 1995. The completion of the master thesis, dealing with the effects of 
competitive tendering in the Swedish bus industry, was followed by related work as a research 
assistant, resulting in a co-authored article on the subject published in the Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy. Doctoral studies were initiated in 1997, along with a research project on the 
development of the Swedish railway sector. A co-authored chapter on railway reforms and the 
introduction of competition in Sweden was included in the recently published Ashgate book 
”Changing Trains” by van de Velde (ed.). The doctoral thesis (due in the year 2000) will cover the 
processes of regulatory changes and their effects in the Swedish bus sector as well as in the railway 
sector. 
 
